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11 Introduction
According to the Taylor principle a central bank should follow an active monetary
policy, i.e. it should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in re-
sponse to changes in current in°ation. Simple interest rate rules consistent with that
recommendation guarantee determinacy, i.e. local uniqueness of rational expecta-
tions equilibrium (REE), in many dynamic New-Keynesian (DNK) models.1 Given
its apparent robustness Clarida et al. (2000), and a large subsequent literature, use
the Taylor principle to judge the conduct of monetary policy in practice.
In the present paper we reassess the usefulness of the Taylor principle. Our model
features Calvo pricing, combined with a convex capital adjustment cost at the ¯rm
level, i.e. we assume that capital is ¯rm-speci¯c. This set of assumptions has been
originally proposed in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5).2 Surprisingly, we ¯nd that an active
monetary policy is not a su±cient condition for determinacy. This is interesting
because most of the existing literature supports the view that the Taylor principle
is robust with respect to the modeling of capital accumulation. An exception is
Dupor (2001). His result that a passive interest rate rule is required to guarantee
determinacy appears, however, to be speci¯c to the continuous time framework he
employs. In a discrete-time model Gal¶ ³ et al. (2004) ¯nd that it is not endogenous
capital per se that challenges the Taylor principle.3
How is it possible that we reach a di®erent conclusion in the present paper? The
answer is that the convenient and widely used assumption of a rental market for
1See, e.g., Taylor (1999) and Woodford (2001).
2Sveen and Weinke (2003, 2004a,b) explain the economic mechanism through which ¯rm-speci¯c
capital a®ects in°ation dynamics in the Calvo model. The latter has been obscured by a conceptual
mistake in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5), as we note. Since we wrote and circulated our papers there
have been other contributions that stress the fruitfulness of assuming ¯rm-speci¯c capital in a
model with staggered price setting. See, e.g., Altig et al. (2004), Christiano (2004), Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2004), and Woodford (2004).
3Lubik (2003) obtains a similar result. He ¯nds that determinacy obtains under an active mon-
etary policy, if conventional values are assigned to both the capital adjustment cost and the price
stickiness parameter. His results are, however, extremely sensitive with respect to the choice of the
capital adjustment cost parameter. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) ¯nd that forward-looking interest
rate rules do generally not guarantee determinacy in a DNK model with capital accumulation.
They do not challenge, however, the usefulness of the Taylor principle.
2capital is not innocuous: it hides an indeterminacy problem. The intuition is as
follows. Current investment increases current marginal cost, but it lowers marginal
cost in the future. A central bank that follows the Taylor principle therefore tends to
decrease future real interest rates in the aftermath of an investment boom. Hence,
to the extent that investment is forward-looking, the expectation of such a boom
could potentially become self-ful¯lling. Whether this possibility materializes, or not,
depends on the degree of price stickiness. With su±ciently high price stickiness REE
is indeterminate, as we will discuss. The last aspect is crucial for the fact that the
rental market assumption hides an indeterminacy problem. As we show in Sveen
and Weinke (2003, 2004b) the di®erence between a speci¯cation with ¯rm-speci¯c
capital and an alternative formulation with a rental market boils down to a di®erence
in implied price stickiness:4 for any given exogenous restriction on price adjustment
there is less price stickiness, if a rental market for capital is assumed.5 Importantly,
with a rental market for capital the resulting price stickiness will generally be too
low to make the indeterminacy issue appear to be relevant from a practical point of
view.6 This conclusion changes if capital is assumed to be ¯rm-speci¯c: if a central
bank respects the Taylor principle and follows a rule according to which the nominal
interest rate is set as a function of in°ation only, then indeterminacy appears to be
the regular case.
Based on our results we reinterpret the conduct of monetary policy under Volcker
and Greenspan. The analyzes in Clarida et al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) suggest that the estimated change from a passive to an active monetary policy
explains in itself the observed stabilization of economic outcomes. We amend their
4The intuition is analog to the one that explains the di®erence in implied in°ation dynamics
resulting from assuming either constant returns to scale or decreasing returns to scale in a DNK
model, along the lines discussed in Sbordone (2002) and Gal¶ ³ et al. (2001).
5The di®erence in implied price stickiness is therefore a useful metric: Sveen and Weinke (2004b)
show that, for a standard calibration of the two models, one needs a Calvo parameter of about 0:9
in the rental market model in order to obtain the equilibrium dynamics resulting form a value of
0:75 in the model with ¯rm-speci¯c capital.
6Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) note that `if prices are extremely sticky' the Taylor principle is
no longer su±cient for determinacy.
3interpretation with a caveat: active monetary policy appears to guarantee desir-
able macroeconomic outcomes only if it is supplemented by interest rate smoothing,
and/or some responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to a measure of economic ac-
tivity. This is precisely the characterization of monetary policy which is empirically
plausible under the Volcker-Greenspan tenure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the model
structure with ¯rm-speci¯c capital and explains how it changes under the alterna-
tive assumption of a rental market for capital. Section 3 presents our results. In
particular, we answer the following three questions. Why is the Taylor principle
not su±cient for determinacy in a model with capital accumulation? Why is price
stickiness crucial for the indeterminacy issue? Why do interest rate smoothing and
responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to economic activity help guaranteeing
determinacy? Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by households and ¯rms. In what follows we reconsider
the model with ¯rm-speci¯c capital outlined in Sveen and Weinke (2004a).7 In the
present paper we assume, however, that there is no aggregate uncertainty except for
sunspots according to which economic agents agree on a particular equilibrium. A
short description of the rental market case is left for the last paragraph.
2.1 Households
Households choose consumption, supply labor in a competitive market, and have
access to complete ¯nancial markets. A representative household seeks to maximize
7In Sveen and Weinke (2004a) we solve the model using an iterative procedure. In the present
paper we follow Woodford (2004) and use the method of undetermined coe±cients, which is com-







where U (¢) denotes the period utility function, ¯ is a discount factor, Nt denotes











where " is the elasticity of substitution between di®erent varieties of goods Ct (i).












Parameter ¾ denotes the household's relative risk aversion, or equivalently, the in-
verse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and parameter Á can be inter-
preted as the the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
The maximization is subject to the following sequence of budget constraints:
Z 1
0
Pt (i)Ct (i)di + Et fQt;t+1Dt+1g · Dt + WtNt + Tt; (4)
where Wt is the time t nominal wage, Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for
random nominal payments, Dt+1 is the nominal payo® of the portfolio held at the
end of period t, and Tt denotes pro¯ts resulting from ownership of ¯rms.















denotes the price index. The latter has the property
that the minimum expenditure required to purchase a bundle of goods resulting in
5Ct units of the composite good is given by PtCt.



















The ¯rst equation is the optimality condition for labor supply, and the second one
is a standard intertemporal optimality condition. Finally, let us note that the time
t gross nominal interest rate, Rt, is related to the stochastic discount factor by the
equilibrium condition R
¡1
t = Et fQt;t+1g.
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ¯rms, indexed on the unit
interval. Each ¯rm i has access to a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt (i) = Kt (i)
® Nt (i)
1¡® ; (8)
where ® is the capital share in the production function, and Kt (i) and Nt (i) denote,
respectively, ¯rm i's capital stock and labor input used in its period t production
denoted Yt (i).
We assume staggered price setting µ a la Calvo (1983), i.e. each ¯rm faces a
constant and exogenous probability, µ, of getting to reoptimize its price in any given
period. This structure implies that ¯rm i's nominal price, Pt (i), is either the one
that was posted the period before or the optimally chosen price P ¤
t (i).
Moreover, we follow Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) in assuming two restrictions on
capital adjustment. First, the additional capital resulting from an investment deci-
sion becomes productive with a one period delay. Second, ¯rms face a convex capital
6adjustment cost.8 This is summarized in the following equation:






where It (i) denotes the amount of the composite good9 purchased by ¯rm i at time t,
and Kt (i) denotes this ¯rm's capital stock as of that period. Moreover, function I(¢)
is assumed to satisfy the following: I(1) = ±, I0(1) = 1, and I00(1) = ²Ã. Parameter
± denotes the depreciation rate. Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) interpret parameter
²Ã as the elasticity of the investment to capital ratio with respect to Tobin's q,
evaluated in steady state. Parameter ²Ã is assumed to be strictly larger than zero
and it measures the convex capital adjustment cost in a log-linear approximation to
the equilibrium dynamics.
Cost minimization by ¯rms and households implies that demand for each indi-












t denotes aggregate demand at time t, which is given by:
Y
d
t ´ Ct + It;
and It ´
R 1
0 It (i)di denotes aggregate investment demand.
Let us now consider a price setter's problem. Given its time t capital stock, Kt (i),






in order to solve the following:
8Sveen and Weinke (2003) consider a model with just the ¯rst restriction on a ¯rm's capital
accumulation, namely the one period delay.









































t+k+1(i) with prob. (1 ¡ µ)
Pt+k(i) with prob. µ
A ¯rm j that is restricted to change its price at time t solves the same problem,
except for the fact that it takes Pt(j) as given.













where MSt+1(i) denotes the nominal reduction in ¯rm i's labor cost associated with
having one additional unit of capital in place in period t+1. The only non-standard
feature of the last equation is that the marginal return to capital is not measured
by the nominal marginal revenue product of capital, but instead by MSt+1(i). The
reason is that ¯rms are demand constrained, as discussed in Woodford (2003, Ch.
5).
The following relationship holds true:




where MPKt (i) and MPLt (i) denote, respectively, the marginal product of capital
and labor of ¯rm i in period t.










t (i) ¡ ¹MCt+k (i)]
ª
= 0; (14)
where ¹ ´ "
"¡1 denotes the frictionless mark-up over marginal costs, and MCt (i)





Equation (14) re°ects the forward-looking nature of price setting: ¯rms take into
account not only current but also future expected marginal costs in those states of
the world where the chosen price is still posted.
2.3 Market Clearing
Clearing of the labor market requires that hours worked, Nt, are given by the fol-





Finally, market clearing for each variety i requires at each point in time:
Yt (i) = C
d




t (i) denotes time t investment demand for good i.
10We follow a large literature on the Calvo model in using the notation Et in equation (14) to
indicate an expectation that is conditional on the time t state of the world, but integrating only
over those future states in which ¯rm i has not reset its price since period t. Woodford (2004) uses
b Ei
t in order to denote this expectation.
92.4 Some Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
We restrict attention to a linear approximation around a steady state with zero
in°ation. Throughout, a hat on a variable denotes the percent deviation of the
original variable with respect to its steady state value.
2.4.1 Households
Solving the household's problem results in an Euler equation and in a labor supply
equation. They read, respectively:
b Ct = Et b Ct+1 ¡
1
¾





= Á b Nt + ¾ b Ct; (19)








Aggregating and log-linearizing the ¯rst order condition for investment (12) and







Et b Kt+2 (20)
+
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)
²Ã (1 + ¯)
Et c mst+1 ¡
1
²Ã (1 + ¯)
(it ¡ Et¼t+1 ¡ ½);
where Kt ´
R 1





denotes the average real marginal return to capital.
We follow Woodford (2004) and derive the in°ation equation by employing the
method of undetermined coe±cients. He shows that it takes the following simple
form:
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + · c mct; (21)




Pt di is the
average real marginal cost.
Aggregating and log-linearizing the production functions of individual ¯rms (8)
results in:
b Yt = ® b Kt + (1 ¡ ®) b Nt: (22)
where Yt ´ K®
t N
1¡®
t is aggregate production, up to the ¯rst order.
2.4.3 Market clearing
Aggregating and log-linearizing the goods market clearing condition for each variety
(17) we obtain:









½+± denotes the steady state consumption to output ratio, and
(1¡³)
±
is the steady state capital to output ratio.
2.5 Rental Market
Let us now assume that households accumulate the capital stock and rent it to
¯rms.11 This structure implies that each ¯rm produces at the same marginal cost
which is independent of the quantity supplied by any individual ¯rm. The associated
in°ation equation reads:
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ¸ c mct; (24)
where ¸ ´
(1¡¯µ)(1¡µ)
µ . It should be noted that the in°ation equation is the only lin-
earized equilibrium condition that is a®ected by the change in assumption regarding
capital accumulation. This means that, given a speci¯cation of monetary policy, the
equilibrium processes for the nominal interest rate, consumption, real wage, capital,
output, hours, and in°ation are determined by equations (18), (19), (20), (22), (23),
11The implied changes in the respective maximization problems of households and ¯rms are
obvious. See, e.g., Gal¶ ³ (2004) et al. for a derivation of the equilibrium conditions resulting from
that set of assumptions.
11and an in°ation equation. The latter is given by equation (21) for the ¯rm-speci¯c
capital model and by equation (24) for the rental market speci¯cation.12
3 Results
Our goal is to explore what are desirable features of interest rate rules in the sense
that they guarantee determinacy. Importantly, the theoretical framework developed
so far can be used to explain why some rules are more desirable than others, as we
will see. Finally, we will show that our results are also useful from a positive point of
view. They call for a reinterpretation of the conduct of U.S. monetary policy under
Volcker and Greenspan.
3.1 Calibration
The period length is one quarter. Consistent with empirical estimates of the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution given by Basu and Kimball (2003) we assume
¾ = 2. We set Á = 1, implying a unit labor supply elasticity. We assign a standard
value of 0:36 to the capital share in the production function, ®. Setting ¯ = 0:99
implies an average annual real return of about 4 percent. We choose " = 11 implying
a frictionless markup of 10 percent, which is in line with the empirical estimate in
Gal¶ ³ et al. (2001). Finally, we set ²Ã = 3, as proposed by Woodford (2003, Ch. 5).
12To solve the dynamic stochastic system of equations we use Dynare
(http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/). Thanks to Larry Christiano for providing us with
Matlab code which we have used in the computation of ·.
123.2 A Simple Interest Rate Rule
Our starting point is a simple rule according to which the nominal interest rate is
set as a function of current in°ation:
it = ½ + ¿¼¼t: (25)
We ask what combinations of values for the in°ation response coe±cient, ¿¼, and
the price stickiness parameter, µ, result in a determinate equilibrium. The result
is shown in Figure 1 for the model with ¯rm-speci¯c capital: a large range of pa-
rameter values that meet the Taylor principle are inconsistent with determinacy.13
An in°ation response coe±cient, ¿¼, strictly larger than one is necessary but not
su±cient for determinacy. Next we develop the intuition behind this result.
We focus on the role of capital accumulation for equilibrium dynamics. Let us
start by conducting a thought experiment. Suppose a sunspot hits the economy
and ¯rms increase their investment spending without any change in the economy's
fundamentals justifying it. Could this investment boom be potentially consistent
with equilibrium? The answer is yes and the reason is simple. Investment has
counteracting e®ects on the determination of the marginal cost. It increases current
marginal cost but it reduces marginal cost in subsequent periods. The resulting
in°ation dynamics inherit the U-shaped marginal cost pattern. In particular, there
will be some period of de°ation in the aftermath of the investment boom. To the
extent that the central bank follows the Taylor principle, the associated real interest
rate will therefore drop in the de°ationary period. The latter could potentially
result in a drop in the long real interest rate relevant for investment.14 If the drop
is su±ciently large, then it may rationalize the investment boom ex post.15
13There is also a standard indeterminacy region in Figure 1. The latter is associated with the
case where the Taylor principle is not met. As one may expect, the dimension of the standard
indeterminacy is one.
14The long real rate relevant for investment can be written as: rr
long
t = ½ +
Et
P1
k=0 ¯k (rrt+k ¡ ½); which is obvious from eqaution (20).
15The reason for the word `su±ciently' is that the average marginal savings in labor costs will
13[Figure 1 about here]
Whether this possibility materializes, or not, depends on both the price stickiness
parameter, µ, and the in°ation response coe±cient, ¿¼, as shown in Figure 1.16 In
order to disentangle the respective roles of the two parameters it is useful to take a
detour. Let us consider, for a moment, an economy which is identical to the one with
endogenous ¯rm-speci¯c capital, except for the fact that capital accumulation at the
¯rm level is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process. The latter is common
to all ¯rms and, speci¯cally, it is assumed to take the following form: b Kt+1 =
(1 ¡ ±) b Kt + et; where et is i:i:d: with zero mean. The in°ation equation resulting
from that set of assumptions reads: ¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + » c mct, with » ´ ¸ 1¡®
1+®("¡1).17
The latter equation di®ers from the one implied by the model with endogenous
¯rm-speci¯c capital. However, this di®erence is negligible, as we show and discuss
in Sveen and Weinke (2004a). The simple exogenous investment economy is therefore
a useful apparatus to analyze the economic mechanisms behind the results shown in
Figure 1. First, we turn to the role of price stickiness. To this end we study impulse
responses associated with a 10% increase in exogenous investment spending relative
to its steady state level. The in°ation response coe±cient, ¿¼, is set to 1:1, implying
that the Taylor principle is met.
[Figure 2 about here]
also tend to decrease in the considered economic situation. We will come back to this point.
16The indeterminacy region associated with the case where the Taylor principle is met does
not lend itself for a simulation of the sunspot since the dimension of indeterminacy is two. For
a discussion of the last point see Gal¶ ³ (1997) and the references herein. Therefore, our thought
experiment illustartes only one from among a continuum of possible responses of the endogenous
variables to a sunspot shock. In doing so it highlights, however, the key economic mechanism
behind our results, namely the role of investment spending for the marginal cost dynamics.
17It should be noted that this equation takes the same form as the one implied by assuming a
constant capital stock at the ¯rm level, as analyzed in Sbordone (2002) and Gal¶ ³ et al. (2001).
14As shown in Figure 2, the assumed degree of price stickiness is critical for the
response of the long real rate. For a value of the price stickiness parameter, µ, equal
to 0:6 the long real rate increases on impact, whereas it decreases if a value of 0:75
is assigned to this parameter. The more forward-looking price setting is the less do
prices increase on impact. The reason is as follows. With higher price stickiness
the expected future reduction in marginal cost resulting from the investment shock
a®ects current price setting more strongly.18 Hence, higher price stickiness dampens
the increase in the current real interest rate on impact. If the current real rate is
su±ciently stable, then the long real rate drops on impact.
This insight from the simple exogenous investment economy helps understanding
the role of price stickiness for indeterminacy in the model with endogenous ¯rm-
speci¯c capital. Indeed, under an interest rate rule that respects the Taylor principle,
a price stickiness parameter, µ, of about 0:63 is needed to obtain indeterminacy, as
shown in Figure 1. This value corresponds to an average lifetime of a price of less
than 3 quarters. Of course, the exact extent to which prices are sticky in actual
economies remains controversial. However, a value of µ as high as 0:75 is often
considered to be empirically plausible.19
Second, we analyze the role of the in°ation response coe±cient, ¿¼, for the results
shown in Figure 1. In order to gather the intuition behind our ¯ndings we reconsider
the simple exogenous investment economy. The price stickiness parameter, µ, is set
to 0:75 and we analyze impulse responses associated with an investment shock, as
speci¯ed above. If the in°ation response coe±cinet, ¿¼, is set to 1:1, then the long
real rate drops on impact, while the opposite holds true for a parameter value of 4.
This is shown in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 about here]
18Clearly, the degree of price stickiness a®ects not only the forward-lookingness of price setting
but also the extent to which the marginal cost changes after the shock. However, our simulation
results justify the simple intuition given in the text.
19The micro evidence on price adjustements is mixed. Golosov and Lucas (2003) suggest that
¯rms change prices on average about every 2 quarters. Baudry et al. (2004) ¯nd, however, a value
of 3 quarters, while the analysis conducted in Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004) suggests 5 quarters.
15We have outlined already the intuition for why the long real rate drops on impact
for empirically plausible speci¯cations of the in°ation response coe±cient and the
price stickiness parameter. The apparently counterintuitive ¯nding in Figure 3 is
that the impact response of the long real rate changes sign for a very aggressive
monetary policy rule. This is, however, for a simple reason. We observe that the
central bank is more e®ective in reducing future de°ation than in reducing current
in°ation: an increase in the response parameter decreases future de°ation, which
in itself tends to increase current in°ation. Hence, if monetary policy is su±ciently
aggressive and future expected de°ation is low, then the relevant long real interest
rate must increase rather than decrease on impact in response to an investment
shock.
Once more, the simple exogenous investment economy helps understanding the
results in Figure 1. Indeed, we ¯nd that from among the rules which meet the
Taylor principle very aggressive rules and intermediate rules, as measured by the
relative size of the respective in°ation response coe±cients, have crucially di®erent
properties: the former rules guarantee determinacy, whereas the latter do not.20 A
maybe somewhat surprising result in Figure 1 is that there also exists a determinacy
region associated with rules that respect the Taylor principle but prescribe a very
gentle interest rate response to in°ation. Our explanation is as follows. If the long
real rate does not change by much then the drop in marginal savings associated with
an investment boom will render REE determinate.
What is the relevance of our indeterminacy results? In related literature Edge
and Rudd (2002) and R¿island (2003) make the case against too gentle interest
rate rules, while Orphanides (2001) points out that too aggressive interst rate rules
are undesirable.21 Combining their ¯ndings with ours we conclude that the Taylor
20Obviously, this claim is conditional on a speci¯cation of the price stickiness parameter that we
have previously characterized as being empirically plausible.
21Edge and Rudd (2002) and R¿island (2003) obtain their results from a simple observation:
taxes are paid on nominal capital income, which calls for a strengthening of the Taylor principle.
On the other hand, Orphanides (2001) argues that very aggressive interest rate rules have the
undesirable property of amplifying mistakes in the conduct of monetary policy.
16principle is a poor guide for the design of monetary policy.
[Figure 4 about here]
As we have argued, forward-looking price setting is one key economic mechanism
behind our results. Indeed, to the extent that a rental market for capital is assumed
price setting is not forward-looking enough to imply indeterminacy, unless extreme
assumptions regarding the frequency of price adjustment are made. This is shown
in Figure 4. These ¯ndings are consistent with those reported by Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2003).
In summary, abstracting from capital accumulation, i.e. considering only con-
sumption demand, which does not produce any counteracting e®ects for the deter-
mination of the marginal cost, or using the rental market assumption, which reduces
the implied price stickiness in the model, obscures the fact that the Taylor principle
is not a useful guide for the design of monetary policy. What form should simple
interest rate rules then take in order to prevent the central bank from becoming a
source of macroeconomic instability?
3.3 More Prominent Interest Rate Rules
We analyze the desirabilty of some interest rate rules that have been proposed in the
literature, either on normative grounds or as an empirically relevant description of
the conduct of monetary policy in practice. As in the previous section our criterion
to assess the performance of a particular interest rate rule is whether or not it
guarantees determinacy.
3.3.1 Responding to Economic Activity
Let us consider ¯rst the indeterminacy regions associated with an interest rate rule
that allows for an output response, in the spirit of Taylor (1993):
it = ½ + ¿¼¼t + ¿yb Yt: (26)
17[Figure 5 about here]
A relatively small size of the output response coe±cient is su±cient to reduce
dramatically the importance of the indeterminacy issue, as shown in Figure 5. The
intuition is straightforward from the thought experiment of an investment boom.
The latter is associated with an increase in current output. If the central bank
reacts with its interest rate instrument directly to this, then the impact of current
investment spending on future marginal cost will generally not result in a monetary
policy which would justify an investment boom ex post. The last result amends
a recent ¯nding by Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004) with a caveat. They study
the welfare properties of alternative interest rate rules across a rich variety of DNK
models. Using a second order approximation they argue that responding to output is
costly in welfare terms.22 However, based on our analysis, reacting to some measure
of real activity will generally prevent the central bank from becoming a source of
unnecessary °uctuations in the economy. This aspect is absent in their analysis,
just because the rental market assumption hides a relevant indeterminacy problem.
Of course, an obvious question is whether or not there exist alternative interest rate
rules which have the property of guaranteeing determinacy (at a possibly smaller
welfare cost).
3.3.2 Interest Rate Smoothing
Let us analyze next the performance of interest rate rules which take the following
form:
it = ½iit¡1 + (1 ¡ ½i)(½ + ¿¼¼t): (27)
With interest rate smoothing the de¯nition of the Taylor principle becomes that
monetary policy should be active in the long run. In a model without capital the
so de¯ned Taylor principle guarantees determincay. This means that the particular
22It should be noted that the analysis in Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004) does not imply that
it would be costly in welfare terms to respond to some output gap measure. However, it is unclear
a priori how natural output should be de¯ned in a model with endogenous capital, as discussed in
Woodford (2003, Ch. 5).
18value of the interest rate smoothing coe±cient, ½i 2 (0;1), is irrelevant for indeter-
minacy, as long as the in°ation response coe±cient, ¿¼, is strictly larger than one.
Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004) argue that this insight is robust with respect to the
modeling of capital accumulation. We ¯nd, however, that the role of interest rate
smoothing changes substantially if capital is ¯rm-speci¯c. This is shown in Figure
6. For a value of ¿¼ strictly larger than one it is not true that determincy would
obtain for all ½i 2 (0;1).23 To our best knowledge this observation is new in the
literature.24
[Figure 6 about here]
The intuition behind this ¯nding is in line with our previous interpretations of
the model. Let us reconsider the thought experiment of an investment boom that
is not justi¯ed by a change in the economy's fundamentals. To the extent that the
central bank behaves in a backward-looking manner the initial increase in in°ation
associated with the boom will keep being relevant for the determination of future
(real) rates. Hence, indeterminacy can be ruled out in this case: the future expected
reduction in marginal cost associated with the investment boom does not dominate
the determination of the long rate relevant for investment. We therefore ¯nd that
interest rate smoothing and responding to real activity are both desirable properties
of interest rate rules, in the sense that they help guranteeing determinacy. Clearly,
a second order approximation to the equilibrium dynamics is required in order to
tell which one of the two features is preferable from a welfare point of view. This is
an interesting line for future research.25
23This is, again, conditional on what we have characterized as an empirically plausible speci¯-
cation of price stickiness.
24In particular, the focus in Benhabib et al. (2003) is di®erent from ours. They conduct a global
analysis and make the case for super-inertial rules (i.e. rules where it on the left hand side of
equation (27) is replaced by ¢it, and ¢ is the ¯rst-di®erence operator). Rules of this type have
also been advocated based on local analysis. See, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
25It should be emphasized that the results from such an analysis are not trivial given the ¯ndings
in Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004). The reason is that a rental market model and a speci¯cation
with ¯rm-speci¯c capital do not just di®er in the in°ation equation if the order of approximation
to the equilibrium dynamics is higher than one.
19Our results regarding the desirability of alternative arrangements for the conduct
of monetary policy are also interesting from a positive point of view. The analyzes
in Clarida et al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) appear to imply that the
estimated change from a passive to an active monetary policy explains in itself the
stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes in the U.S. that has been observed in the
early 1980's. We take the occurrence of self-ful¯lling expectations, or lack thereof,
as a possible explanation for the observed reduction in macroeconomic instability
under the Volcker-Greenspan tenure.26 However, viewed through the lense of a DNK
model with ¯rm-speci¯c capital, the interpretation of their empirical results changes:
active monetary policy appears to guarantee desirable macroeconomic outcomes
only if it is supplemented by interest rate smoothing, and/or some responsiveness
of the nominal interest rate to a measure of economic activity. Interestingly, this
is precisely the characterization of monetary policy which is empirically plausible
under the Volcker-Greenspan tenure.
4 Conclusion
According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest
rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current in°ation. This
recommendation is generally believed to be a useful guide for the design of monetary
policy. We ¯nd, however, that by following the Taylor principle a central bank
does not necessarily avoid becoming a source of marcoeconomic instability. More
importantly, to the extent that a central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate
in response to in°ation only, indeterminacy appears to be the regular case. This
challenges much of the conventional wisdom regarding desirable features of interest
rate rules.
The reason for why our results di®er from those that have been obtained in the
26For a discussion of alternative hypotheses that explain this change in macroeconomic outcomes,
see Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
20existing literature lies in the fact that we model a simultaneous price setting and
investment decision at the ¯rm level, instead of focusing on the price setting decision
alone. Our results follow from an interaction of two economic mechanisms: forward-
lookingness in investment and in price setting. In explaining these mechanisms we
build on our earlier work where Sveen and Weinke (2003, 2004a,b) solve and discuss
models with ¯rm-speci¯c capital and Calvo pricing.
Based on our insights we make the case for interest rate rules prescribing that
the central bank should allow for some interest rate smoothing and/or react to some
measure of economic activity. We also use our theoretical results to reinterpret
the empirical estimates in Clarida et al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
It is not plausible that active monetary policy in itself would have stabilized the
economy. Our interpretation is that the whole design of monetary policy is crucial:
active monetary policy appears to guarantee desirable macroeconomic outcomes
only if it is supplemented by interest rate smoothing, and/or some responsiveness
of the nominal interest rate to a measure of economic activity. This interpretation
is consistent with both our theory and their empirical estimates.
21Appendix: In°ation Dynamics
Woodford (2004) posits that the price chosen by a Calvo price setter i is:
b p
¤
t (i) = b p
¤
t ¡ ¿1b kt (i); (A1)






Pt , and ¿1 is an unknown parameter. He further
assumes that the investment decision of any ¯rm j satis¯es:
b kt+1 (j) = ¿2b kt (j) + ¿3b pt (j); (A2)
where pt (j) ´
Pt(j)
Pt , and ¿2 and ¿3 are two additional unknown parameters.
Finally, he invokes the relationship between the log-linearized average newly set
price, b p¤







Combined with the ¯rst-order conditions for price setting and investment it is pos-
sible to pin down the unknown coe±cients ¿1, ¿2, and ¿3 and to derive the in°ation
equation (21), along the lines outlined in Woodford (2004).
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Figure 1: Indeterminacy with Firm-Speci¯c Investment






















Relevant long real rate
θ = 0.6
θ = 0.75
Figure 2: Di®erent Price Stickiness Parameters in the Exogenous Investment Model

































Figure 3: Di®erent In°ation Responses in the Exogenous Investment Model

















Figure 4: Indeterminacy and the Rental Market























Figure 5: Indeterminacy when Reacting to Output























Figure 6: Indeterminacy and Interest Rate Smoothing
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